Reviewed by NEAL GENDLER
Contrary to the usual perception, Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman say that the second Lebanon war was a “strategic win” for Israel.
The 2006 campaign, usually considered a flop, did have its successes, the authors say: Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s scolding by his Iranian sponsors for kidnapping Israeli soldiers, over which Israel went to war; targeting the 100 houses to which Hezbollah had built additions with retractable roofs hiding long-range missiles; and driving Nasrallah into hiding so deep he didn’t make a public appearance for five years.
Spies Against Armageddon is the pair’s third book about Israeli intelligence; their 1990 Every Spy a Prince was a New York Times bestseller. They do not disappoint this time, either, saying they use previously unavailable material and interviews.
They say Mossad has become “an internationally recognized Israeli brand name.” The brand actually includes Mossad, which generally focuses outside Israel; Shin Bet, operating mostly inside; and Aman, military intelligence.
CBS correspondent Raviv and Melman, an Israeli newspaper reporter, relate Israel’s intelligence history, describing triumphs and failures in the hidden world of gathering information, placing agents, recruiting sources among enemies and — as a last resort — ordering assassinations, of which they say agents have done fewer than 50 in 62 years, always trying to avoid or minimize injury to innocents.
Targeted killings, when disclosed, get public attention, often retaliation and other nations’ public professions of disapproval. For example, the 2010 death of Hamas killer and supply chief Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai is said to have involved multiple operatives — using Western nations’ passports — who were photographed on hotel cameras. Despite foreign criticism, “as assessed by the Mossad, the mission was a success” — Mabhouh was dead and the combatants returned home, true identities unknown.
Since 1951, the Mossad has cooperated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Among surprises: In 1983, former director George H.W. Bush was behind the use of U.S. military transports to fly Ethiopian Jews from Somalia to Israel.
Triumphs include detailed information for destroying Iraq’s nuclear reactor; “breakthrough to the top echelon of Western intelligence” by obtaining a copy of Nikita Krushchev’s 1956 secret speech disclosing Stalin’s crimes; capturing Adolf Eichmann in Argentina; obtaining an Iraqi MiG-21 in 1965; allowing evaluation of Israel’s and the United States’ top air adversary; turning a spy into a double agent to convince Egypt in 1967 that Israel would attack first on the ground; and recruiting an Egyptian who was a close aide to Egyptian President Sadat, son of a high-ranking officer and son-in-law of former President Nasser.
Among frustrations: providing warnings of war in 1973 that “were simply not heeded”; the Jonathan Pollard debacle in which the United States broke its promise of no life sentence in return for Pollard’s cooperation; killing the wrong man in Norway; and Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, Shin Bet’s nadir.
Raviv and Melman are particularly fascinating when they describe the extent of preparation needed to produce results. But a problem with books about intelligence work is the reader’s inability to know what’s true; some such books have been called partly or mostly invented.
Although there’s no bibliography and chapter endnotes aren’t linked to specific pages, Raviv and Melman likely are accurate. They can read and interview primary sources in Hebrew and they’ve covered this topic for decades without — so far as I know — being discredited. A history of accuracy tends to encourage news-source candor.
I suspect that Raviv and Melman were careful about disclosures. The acknowledgements say portions of Melman’s writing were submitted to Israel’s military censor, who made “very minor deletions.” Readers are helped by lists of agency leaders and a modest index.
Mossad’s work benefits from its enormous reputation, but is it really that good? “Yes,” the authors say. “Especially considering Israel’s Lilliputian size, it is stunningly effective.”
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Neal Gendler is a Minneapolis writer and editor.
(American Jewish World, 9.14.12)
